A posthumously published speech by Karl V. Steinbrugge to the Commonwealth Club of California in 1973.
For the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI), he was one of the organizers of the first of the World Conferences on Earthquake Engineering in 1956. Those who consult a copy of the proceedings of that conference will find that it could be purchased by writing to Karl Steinbrugge at the Pacific Fire Rating Bureau (now the Insurance Services Office) in San Francisco, where he was the manager and kept stacks of those books underneath a desk. Also in those early days of EERI when there was no office, no staff, and little or no external funding, he served as President in 1968 and 1969 . He received the Housner Medal of EERI, the SSA Medal of the Seismological Society of America, and was the first recipient after state Senator Alfred Alquist of the Alquist Award for Achievement in Earthquake Safety.
Steinbrugge field investigated many earthquakes. His in-depth study of the Kern County Earthquakes of 1952 conducted with Donald Moran is a classic reconnaissance report, with ground motion, ground failures, structural engineering, lifelines, and emergency response and social aspects all given thorough treatment. Many other earthquakes in the United States and abroad were rapidly visited by Steinbrugge when ''earthquake chasing'' was an effort engaged in by only a select few dedicated individuals. From his work in investigating many earthquakes developed a collection of over 15,000 photographs that he donated to the National Information Service for Earthquake Engineering library at U.C. Berkeley, which was the impetus for beginning the important digitized image collection that has been expanded and maintained there over the years.
A brief listing of Steinbrugge's experience concerning the public policy topic of his speech includes being a key supporter and technical resource of the Joint Committee on Seismic Safety of the California Legislature, which prepared the ground for the passage of historic laws and policies after the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake concerning hospitals, dams, bridges, fault zones, and other topics. His 1968 Earthquake Hazard in the San Francisco Bay Area: A Continuing Problem in Public Policy, published by the Institute of Governmental Studies at U.C. Berkeley, was a book that had a significant effect in getting the attention of legislators and other government officials. He was the key individual working to form the California Seismic Safety Commission and served as its chair from its establishment in 1975 to 1977. Working also with the executive branch of California government, he was a member of the California Governor's Earthquake Council established after the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake. From his background in earthquake insurance came a recognition of the need to develop earthquake loss estimates or forecasts. The first of the large earthquake loss studies was published in 1972 by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration on the effects of scenario earthquakes on the San Francisco Bay Region. Ted Algermissen of the U.S. Geological Survey was the lead researcher on the seismological aspects of the scenario while Steinbrugge headed up the work of engineers and others to assess damage and casualties.
While he was prominent in public policy in California, he later became one of the most influential individuals in federal public policy concerning earthquakes. He was one of the key individuals working on the drafting of the 1977 Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act and subsequently was appointed the head of the Working Group on Earthquake Hazards Reduction of the Office of Science and Technology Policy of the Executive Office of the President. The report of that Working Group, Earthquake Hazards Reduction: Issues for an Implementation Plan (1978) was a precocious overview of the topics federal agencies had to face in carrying out the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP), and it is considered a masterwork of diplomacy in the way Steinbrugge personally met with dozens of federal agency representatives to smoothly and noncontroversially begin to move earthquake concerns into their programs.
Readers may gain a broader perspective concerning their current earthquake risk reduction efforts by considering the public policy strategy outlined in the following speech given by Steinbrugge half a century ago.
Address by Karl Steinbrugge to the Commonwealth Club of California, 30 March 1973: Earthquake hazard and public policy in California It's a pleasure indeed to have the opportunity to speak before the Commonwealth Club of California. For many years I have known many members, and certainly the speakers that have been here have been renowned, and I am honored to be on the podium today and be able to talk to you on a subject that is dear to my heart.
In the United States, the hazards from earthquakes are more commonly associated with the state of California than with any other state. In addition, the daily press has often given particular emphasis to the metropolitan areas of San Francisco and Los Angeles. While disastrous earthquakes have occurred elsewhere throughout the United States, their relatively high frequency along coastal California compared with other high population densities quite rightly places heavy national focus on this state. However, for many years, California's public reaction to this hazard, through its elected officials, its representatives in government, as well as the governmental bureaucracy itself, was to ignore this problem as if in the hope it would quietly disappear and go away. It has only been in the last several decades that public policy has changed and the hazard is now receiving increasingly heavy attention, especially at the state level. The intent of this presentation is to briefly summarize some of the historical development of public policy in California and to examine some of the more important changes taking place today. The emphasis is on state of California policy, which of course cannot be fully divorced from federal policy.
Let's look back historically for a moment. It is appropriate to very briefly review the background of public attitudes toward seismic safety and their consequences on public policy. Professor Andrew Lawson, writing in the March 1911 issue of the Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America stated, and I quote,
In the present state of public opinion in California, for example, it is practically impossible to secure state aid for the study of earthquakes. The commercial spirit of the people fears any discussion of earthquakes for the same reason as it taboos any mention of an occurrence of the plague in the city of San Francisco. It believes that such discussion will advertise California as an earthquake region and so hurt business.
In the years that followed the 1906 San Francisco disaster, the public press generally referred to the event as the 1906 fire, with little reference to the earthquake that caused the fire. San Francisco building code provisions that were strengthened with respect to lateral forces after the 1906 earthquake were reduced as years went by. Public policy was to downplay the hazard of earthquake, just as Professor Lawson had written in 1911. San Francisco was not alone in this ostrich-like viewpoint. A book published in 1928 by the Southern California Academy of Sciences stated in its summary of conclusions, and I quote,
The accumulated weight of data substantiates beyond a doubt my deduction that Los Angeles is in no danger of a great earthquake disaster. Further, the city of Los Angeles is remotely situated from the three lines of maximum seismicity in California.
The 1933 Long Beach Earthquake turned this book into a collector's item, a classic.
After the Long Beach shock, and to southern California's credit, public policy recognized the hazard in the form of earthquake bracing in local building codes. These provisions were substantially superior to anything hithertofore enacted in the United States. The state of California also responded with its well-known Field Act, which resulted in vastly stronger public schools. Coming back to northern California, the city of San Francisco officially ignored the hazard in its building code as did most, though not all of the jurisdictions, in the metropolitan San Francisco Bay Area. This situation of ''let's avoid it'' continued to almost 1950. In the years since 1950, interest in earthquake hazard reduction has rapidly increased throughout California. The state's worldwide leadership in the development of earthquake provisions in building codes became evident in the period between 1956 and 1960 through the efforts of civil and structural engineers. In addition, within the past decade, the subject of earthquake hazard reduction has received remarkable interest throughout the United States, stimulating further efforts in California. Over the past 20 years, this interest has been largely confined to civil and structural engineers, except for certain outstanding individuals among geologists, seismologists, and architects. Virtually no attention has been given over this past 20-year span has been given to the problem by social scientists. Until recently, effective federal support has been token to minimal in earthquake hazard reduction programs, despite numerous reports since 1965 issued by various agencies, interagency groups, and outside organizations. The situation has been slowly but noticeably improving since the 1964 Alaska Earthquake. However, at this point in time, the federal government is reassessing its budget allocations in this area as far as I can determine. While the disciplines of seismology and geology are increasingly turning their attention to earthquake hazard reduction, it is my view that until the last 2 or 3 years, public policy decisions as they affect the safety of everyday building construction were essentially in the hands of civil and structural engineers. The principal exceptions were the nuclear reactors and dams, which represent special cases. Recent earthquake experience in the United States, such as I've gathered from the earthquakes in Alaska in 1964 , Santa Rosa in 1969 , and San Fernando in 1971 shown that certain earthquake hazard problems exist that require attention of many disciplines in addition to those of civil and structural engineering. This experience showed that civil and structural engineers did in general design and construct buildings that were adequately safe for the large majority, though not all occupants of buildings during earthquake. Perfection was not achieved, and substantial numbers of casualties could occur from a small percentage of modern buildings that are expected to collapse or be severely damaged for a variety of reasons. In addition, the problem of fire following earthquake, and for building evacuation, is becoming increasingly significant as the height and number of high-rise buildings increase. This is a real upcoming problem.
The current philosophy of earthquake-resistant design as expressed in the public policy contained in building codes states in part: buildings are to resist major earthquakes of the intensity of severity of the strongest experienced in California without collapse but with some structural as well as nonstructural damage. Let's go into that a little bit more.
Obviously, examples such as the collapse of the Four Seasons apartment house in Anchorage in the 1964 Alaska shock, the significantly damaged social services building after the moderate Santa Rosa shock of 1969, and the nearly collapsed multistory Olive View Hospital after the moderate San Fernando shock of 1971 show that significant engineering and scientific problems still remain.
What is the hazard today? Before going any further, it is certainly valid to ask, how can one determine public policy without some facts and figures? Time does not permit anything more than an overview response by using metropolitan San Francisco Bay region as an example. A recent major study by the Office of Emergency Preparedness of the federal government quantified the probable number of deaths and injuries in the event of various magnitude earthquakes on the San Andreas and Hayward Faults in the San Francisco Bay Area. This study also considered such factors as time of day with respect to casualties-are you at home, or at work-effects on utilities, transportation, communications, medical resources, and others. The purpose of the study was to form the basis for realistic federal, state, and local response to disaster. What is the potential magnitude of these problems? In the event of the maximum credible earthquake on the San Andreas Fault and under a combination of adverse conditions, 10,000 deaths could be expected from building collapse. This is a large figure, but in contrast to the Bay Area population, this amounts to one-half of 1%, and remember, this is under unlikely conditions. Elsewhere in the world, we'll have 10-fold, 20-fold as many. Certainly the San Francisco Bay Area will have severe problems, but also certainly the area will not be leveled. (I live a quarter of a mile from one of these active faults, and I feel reasonably safe.) In the event of a maximum credible earthquake on the Hayward Fault, which runs through the cities of Oakland, Berkeley, Hayward, Fremont, and others, the comparable death toll is expected to be about 7,000, remember, under a collection of rather adverse conditions. This is substantially less than what we expect from a great earthquake on the San Andreas Fault. However, other kinds of problems will be more significant. For example, serious damage or ruptures will occur along the fault to water conduits from the Sierra Nevada mountains, to natural gas and oil transmission lines, to rapid transit systems, to freeways, and other vital facilities. A careful examination of the findings of this report, as well as those from other studies, shows that most of these hazards can be significantly reduced. However, to bring about improvements, some broad changes in public policy, including state legislation, have become necessary.
What are these? Significant changes in public policy do not always follow a disaster, as was evident in 1906. However, since the 1971 San Fernando shock, public policy changes have reflected the changing public attitudes in California, and the full significance of some of these changes is not yet fully understood by all persons, including engineers. The principal changes are embodied in legislation introduced by Senator Alquist and others of the California's Legislature Joint Committee on Seismic Safety. The principal changes are also embodied in executive actions resulting from recommendations of the Governor's Earthquake Council. The specifics of some of these changes will be discussed later on. The current significant interest in both the legislative and executive branches of California state government effectively began with Senate Concurrent Resolution 128 introduced by Senator Alquist in 1969. This resolution created a joint committee on seismic safety within the legislature. The Joint Committee began meeting in January of 1970. It was supported by special advisory groups, consisting of over 70 persons from numerous disciplines and walks of life. A number of them are in the audience today. The 9 February 1971 San Fernando Earthquake added an entirely new dimension to this effort. The Joint Committee was directed by the legislature to appoint a special three-man committee to conduct an in-depth investigation of the earthquake. All of the foregoing gave impetus to the passage of earthquake hazard legislation, much of which broke new ground in public policy. Now let's turn to the executive. In January of 1972, Governor Ronald Reagan appointed the Governor's Earthquake Council in recognition of the need for a coordinated approach within the executive branch of government on earthquake hazard reduction problems. The work of the Council has made significant progress toward achieving its objectives. The Council's first report, dated 21 November 1972, clearly showed effective action and clearly showed the complexity of organizing the numerous state agencies into effective action. The work of the legislature's Joint Committee and that of the Governor's Earthquake Council has not overlapped, and the working relationships have been good. That is something I am really gratified to note. It is reasonable to expect that these groups will produce excellent overall results as each completes its work in the next 2 years.
What are these significant changes in policy? A brief review of some of them certainly warrants attention. First let's consider hospital safety. A very significant change in public policy is included in the legislation by which the state preempted new hospital construction from local control, Senate Bill 519. It is of little point to spell out the technical details of this legislation other than to state it followed the precepts of the State of California Field Act for public schools, plus the following statement, which is of major importance from my viewpoint:
It is the intent of the legislature that hospitals, which house patients who have less than the capacity of normally healthy persons to protect themselves, and which must be completely functional to perform all necessary services to the public after disaster, shall be designed and constructed to resist insofar as is practicable the forces generated by earthquakes, gravity, and wind.
It is important to note the basic earthquake design concept expressed earlier in this presentation, namely that buildings may suffer significant damage in a great earthquake, and by implication no longer remain functional, and by and large that is the way San Francisco and Los Angeles buildings are constructed. With respect to that original concept, that is no longer an acceptable level of risk for our new hospitals in California. Future seismic structural design must include among many other items the consequences of relative motion among floors. Some of the features that will require special seismic design attention are elevators, stairs, air conditioning and heating systems, water supply, electric power, communications, and medical supplies. In the past, I might add, these have been largely neglected insofar as law is concerned. Potential damage to smoke tower walls, which could allow fire to spread upward through multistory buildings, requires obvious attention. The intent of the legislation does not state that the hospital must remain undamaged or earthquake-proof, but it must remain functional in order to perform all necessary services. Clearly, the intent of the law will result in the mandatory inputs from many disciplines: civil, structural, mechanical, electrical, fire protection, architectural, and geological, as well as many others. In other words, we're broadening the base of the input of the disciplines in contrast to what I mentioned earlier. The concept of hospital buildings remaining completely functional during and subsequent to an earthquake is being considered for other types of occupancies vital to the public after disaster. Specifically, consideration is being given at this point in time to the introduction of legislation which will extent this concept of functional adequacy to other kinds of emergency services structures, such as fire stations and disaster command posts. May I add parenthetically that Alameda County has a rather dubious distinction of having an underground disaster command post located within the seismically active Hayward Fault Zone. The concept could also be extended to other kinds of disaster, such as flood. In any event, the implementation of the concept of functional adequacy during and subsequent to an earthquake will require new approaches in structural design for all components necessary for the operation of a building, and new kinds of building code provisions, and certainly multidisciplinary approaches to building design. No one person can be totally responsible.
There's another concept that is in legislation, and that's inundation maps for areas downstream of dams. For many years, a state agency has concerned itself with the safety of dams, including seismic safety. Its safety requirements were guided by the state of the art of dam design and construction, which of course must change with time. In general, this agency has performed excellently; however, the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake showed that the state of the art of the design and construction of dams, just as that for buildings, was not perfect, as evidenced by the near-catastrophic failure of the Lower San Fernando Dam. This dam had received conditional approval of the state agency prior to the earthquake. As a partial result, Senate Bill 896 was passed, which required certain dam owners to file inundation maps with specified agencies that are concerned with dam safety and disaster preparedness. The foregoing was a change in public policy, in that dams are no longer considered to be perfectly safe by the public, even when thoroughly checked by governmental agencies. The preparation of inundation maps clearly indicates a hazard, which presumably is sufficiently small to be considered as an acceptable risk for downstream public use. Conceivably, in time, public pressure could require secondary or backup construction features for downstream vital facilities. Some precedent already exists for this in the design of nuclear power plants.
Let's turn to another piece of legislation that will have quite a bit of impact. Increasing public concern has been given to the construction in geologically hazardous areas. Earthquake geologic hazards are usually classified as active geologic faults, structurally poor ground, such as marsh land, and potential landslide areas. Problems related to structurally poor ground have received attention from the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission when the Commission appointed in 1968 what is now known as the Engineering Criteria Review Board. This Board examines engineering design criteria for proposed projects in San Francisco Bay margins, where soils are normally of structurally poor types, including those classified as Bay Muds. The Board's policies are intended to insure that such additional safety measures as may be necessary to adequately compensate for any increased risk, including seismic risk on poor ground. As a result, a project is generally buildable, but it may be shelved due to increased construction cost needed to meet the high design criteria. From a public policy standpoint, it should be understood that designation of areas of structurally poor or hazardous soil does not prohibit construction on them, provided that the design has appropriately compensated for the unfavorable conditions. Earthquake active faults, such as the San Andreas, Inglewood-Newport, and the Hayward, have received considerable attention in the popular press. These faults, among others, certainly pose special problems for buildings located on them as well as for facilities that must cross them, such as highways, water pipes, and gas mains. Two recently enacted bills warrant special attention. One bill, directed toward city planning efforts, specifies that a seismic safety element must be included in the city and county general plans, and therefore it becomes necessary to study and report on geologic hazards. This legislation is currently interpreted to include non-geologic hazards such as damage to buildings throughout a city and to earthquake disaster preparedness. A second piece of legislation is in effect a state-local partnership with respect to active earthquake faults. The following are extracts from the legislation, which indicates the direction of public policy. I might add concerning this and the previously cited pieces of legislation, they are not yet in effect pending resolution of certain engineering and procedural problems. In order to assist cities and counties in their planning, zoning, and building regulations, the State Geologist shall delineate by 31 December 1973 (the end of this year) appropriately wide zones to encompass all potentially and recently active traces of the San Andreas, Calaveras, Hayward, and San Jacinto Faults, and such other faults or segments thereof as deemed sufficiently active. Within the special studies zones, the site of every proposed new real estate development or structure for human occupancy shall be approved by the city or county in accordance with the policies and criteria established by the State Mining and Geology Board and the findings of the State Geologist. This bill, in effect, gives local jurisdictions access to certain kinds of technical competencies that most of them do not have, or have only to a limited degree. This partnership between state and local government will be most interesting to watch since, if successful, it could be a vehicle for other efforts.
I would now like to pull together my summary and conclusions. Historically, the earthquake hazard in California was largely ignored from a public policy standpoint until 1933 in southern California and until about 1950 in northern California. The tempo of change has been greatest in the last few decades, with the 1971 San Fernando shock bringing about additional substantive changes. In my opinion, the most significant of these changes in public policy, now in the process of implementation, will save lives and certainly reduce the life hazard from what I mentioned earlier.
One, the new concept that certain facilities vital to the public must remain functional in addition to being safe. Recently enacted law is with respect to new hospitals, and other legislation is being considered for other occupancy types. Certainly, damage control is a new dimension insofar as earthquake building regulations are concerned.
Two, the implication in law that perfect seismic safety does not exist. This mandatory preparation of inundation maps in areas below dams clearly implies that risk exists, but also implies that public policy deems the areas to be within acceptable risk levels.
Three, construction in earthquake geologically hazardous areas is acceptable, provided sufficient precautions are taken to reduce the hazard to acceptable risk levels.
There is much I would like to discuss further. One is the concept of acceptable risk, which is really determined by the interplay of the public and ourselves in the engineering and geological disciplines. These are interesting problems that you will see in the newspaper and will be discussed as time goes on, and they are problems that should not be solely solved by the engineer or the scientist. I look forward to these future discussions. I thank you very much for the opportunity to speak here today.
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